

CRIMINAL LAW RISKS OF DIGITALIZATION: THE USE OF NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS AND CRYPTOCURRENCIES IN TERRORIST FINANCING

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Article info

Received –

2026 February 04

Accepted –

2026 June 20

Available online –

2026 September 20

Keywords

Terrorist financing, digital transactions, assistance, intent, cryptocurrency, criminal liability

The article examines the transformation of the structure of criminal conduct associated with the financing of terrorist activities under the impact of digital financial technologies, specifically virtual assets, distributed ledgers, anonymised communication channels, and automated transfer mechanisms.

The main purpose of the study is to verify the scientific hypothesis that the digital environment fundamentally deconstructs the traditional material forms of criminal assistance, erasing the boundaries of the objective elements of the offence and blurring the parameters of criminal liability.

The study is based on a complex methodological framework that integrates formal legal analysis of criminal law provisions, comparative law methods, and a multi-disciplinary approach that connects legal doctrine with technical models of blockchain architecture and decentralised systems.

The study demonstrates that digital financial transformation removes the physical and material form of criminal action, creating profound difficulties in establishing causation within distributed transaction chains. Particular attention is devoted to the phenomena of indirect assistance and "cyber-aiding", which arise from the purely technical maintenance of digital infrastructure and ensure the operability of value-transfer channels without exhibiting the traditional features of direct financial provision. Furthermore, the paper explores the theoretical obstacles to reconstructing criminal intent in digital transfers, as the automated and decentralised nature of operations obscures the intellectual components of individual conduct and complicates the assessment of subjective guilt.

The author concludes that the initial scientific hypothesis is confirmed. To achieve legal certainty, it is necessary to improve criminal law doctrine and legislation by expanding the criteria for distinguishing technical infrastructure maintenance from criminally relevant conduct, introducing specific legal definitions for digital forms of assistance, and adapting the concepts of complicity and causation to the realities of financial digitalisation.

1. Introduction

The evolution of legal approaches to terrorism financing reveals that the initial elements of this offense were conceptualized when communication and financial operations were baseline physical. Traces of such activities were recorded primarily through bank statements, cash flows, and conventional channels of illicit cooperation. However, the expansion of digital infrastructure altered both the mechanics of asset transfer and the interaction models among actors involved in accumulating and redistributing financial resources. This shift is driven by the emergence of decentralized networks, alternative digital payment systems, and widespread cryptocurrency circulation.

The migration of financial communications to the digital environment diminishes the clarity of established criminological indicators. Modern transactions are executed rapidly, distributed across multiple nodes, and fail to trigger the law enforcement alerts that previously signaled illicit capital flight. Consequently, an operation may retain the appearance of a routine technical transaction while its underlying purpose eludes conventional scrutiny. As digital expansion accelerates, criminal law doctrine must reexamine its most deeply entrenched concepts.

Digital operations—including cryptocurrency transfers and distributed platform transactions—exhibit a dual nature, combining structural neutrality with the capacity to sustain terrorist organizations. As a result, law enforcement finds that traditional methods for establishing *mens rea* elements are increasingly ineffective. Analyzing contemporary strategies against digital financing mechanisms, Abazov notes that the digitalization of financial platforms enables rapid, borderless resource movement; this shift necessitates a revision of the statutory criteria used to qualify acts supporting terrorist structures.

Concurrently, the role of ancillary forms of participation is expanding, outstripping conventional mechanisms for recording criminal

behavior. In the digital environment, indirect assistance, technical maintenance of network platforms, and the use of anonymized data transmission channels create a broad tier of actions that resist integration into the classic framework of complicity. Digital infrastructure enables assistance without direct interaction among perpetrators, and often without any individual awareness of the broader criminal scheme.

Addressing this issue, Prorovich and Rastoropov argue that building a robust system of criminal law protection for modern social relations—amid the transition to an information society and a knowledge economy—demands revisions and supplements to the relevant chapters of the Russian Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, as well as several other federal statutes and regulations. Providing a proper justification for these legislative updates requires a collective effort from scholars spanning various fields of criminal law and information science.

Given these considerations, the relevance of this study lies not in reiterating well-worn claims about technological expansion, but in identifying the specific friction points that alter the structure of the *corpus delicti* and reshape its doctrinal interpretation.

2. Digitalization of Financial Communications and the Transformation of Corpus Delicti Elements

The evolution of asset transfer mechanisms indicates that the digital environment fosters a new capital movement model characterized by the absence of traditional operational tangibility. Virtual assets, distributed ledgers, cryptocurrency wallets, and anonymized platforms dissociate the functional execution of a financial flow from its legal substance. Within criminal law, this shift fundamentally alters the perception of the *actus reus*: socially dangerous conduct is increasingly concealed beneath the technical shell of a transaction that lacks overt indicators of illegality.

An analysis of criminal behavior within the

digital financial ecosystem reveals that the prohibited act loses its definitive boundaries. Instead of a single act of transferring funds, a chain of technical operations emerges, each potentially neutral on its face. Consequently, the clear distinction blurs between the core components of the *actus reus* and actions serving merely as technical links. While criminological risk in traditional frameworks centered on the discrete moment of asset delivery, in the digital space it is dispersed across multiple operations, many of which are automated and execute outside direct human agency. Examining the use of digital assets to sustain illicit entities, Kindeeva emphasizes that the technical form of an operation must not preclude criminological analysis, given that digital assets effectively function as stores of value within the material infrastructure of unlawful schemes.

The emergence of novel digital instruments necessitates an inquiry into their legal nature relative to the elements of a crime. Their architecture inherently pairs technical accessibility with extreme decentralization, while transaction ledger mechanisms operate independently of state jurisdictions. Ultimately, the digital environment introduces the risk that the legal construction of an illicit act becomes dependent upon the technical parameters of the network.

Traditional contact between co-perpetrators is supplanted by the utilization of distributed platforms, anonymous channels, and intermediary services. Consequently, the *actus reus* dissolves into a sequence of technical operations, each interpretable only when evaluated within the broader context of the digital ecosystem.

The expansion of network communications likewise alters the mechanics of causation within the *corpus delicti*. While the traditional model of causality presupposes that an individual's act produces a distinct consequence through a traceable chain of events, this logic breaks down in the digital environment. The dispersion of numerous transactions across various network nodes obscures the direct impact of an actor's conduct on the ultimate financing of terrorist activities. Accordingly, the issue of causation

extends beyond mere factual reconstruction, acquiring theoretical significance in defining the boundaries of the offense.

Under these conditions, criminal law theory must refine those elements of the *corpus delicti* previously deemed immutable: the *actus reus*, the causal link, and the specific nature of actions that constitute terrorism financing.

3. Issues of Indirect Assistance and Cyber-Complicity within the Terrorism Financing Mechanism

The structure of assistance to terrorist activities in the digital environment is delineated by the provisions of Articles 205 and 205.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter CC RF), which establish the framework for the criminal law assessment of conduct that provides financial or other resource support to terrorist entities. The legislature explicitly outlines the core elements of terrorist activity; specifically, Article 205, Part 1 of the CC RF defines a terrorist act as “the commission of an explosion, arson, or other actions that terrify the population and create a danger to human life... for the purpose of destabilizing the activities of government authorities... or influencing their decision-making.”

The statutory foundation for complicity is articulated in Article 205.1 of the CC RF. The very title of this provision — “Assistance to Terrorist Activity”—signals the legislative intent to consolidate multiple forms of participation under a single norm, encompassing both direct resource provision and indirect methods of amplifying criminal operations. Article 205.1, Part 1 penalizes the “inducement, recruitment, or other involvement of a person... as well as the arming or training of a person” for the purpose of committing terrorism-related offenses. Digital technologies inherently alter the nature of such involvement, translating it into remote communication and digital brokerage. Crucially, Article 205.1, Part 1.1 expands this scope by explicitly adding: “as well as the financing of terrorism.” This construction demonstrates that financing is integrated into the

framework of assistance as an element independent of any physical execution of a terrorist offense by the principal perpetrator. The statute is fundamentally designed to evaluate the conduct of the resource provider. Consequently, under the current statutory language, any digital transfer executed in favor of a terrorist organization may fall within this provision, provided that the requisite *mens rea* elements are established.

A detailed definition of financing is provided in Note 1 to Article 205.1. The legislature states that "the financing of terrorism... refers to the provision or collection of funds or the rendering of financial services with the awareness that they are intended to finance the organization, preparation, or commission of at least one of the offenses... or to finance or otherwise materially support a person... or to support an organized group, an illegal armed formation, or a criminal community." Certain digital operations fall within this definition if they constitute the technical infrastructure enabling the transfer of assets to terrorist organizations.

The legal assessment of cyber-complicity relies on Note 1.1 to Article 205.1 of the CC RF, which stipulates that "complicity... refers to the intentional assistance in the commission of an offense through advice, instructions, the provision of information, means, or instruments... or the removal of obstacles... as well as a promise to conceal the perpetrator, means, or instruments..." The statutory text does not limit the methods of providing information or removing obstacles. Consequently, cyber-complicity executed through digital channels—such as configuring an anonymizing service, granting access to a cryptocurrency wallet, or transferring encryption keys—aligns with these established statutory forms. Complicity is ultimately defined not by the technological modality of the act, but by the legally operative role the conduct plays within the mechanism of facilitating the offense.

Article 205.1, Part 4 of the CC RF further categorizes the organization of terrorism financing as one of the most severe forms of complicity, stipulating that "the organization of the financing

of terrorism... shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of fifteen to twenty years... or by life imprisonment." Here, the legislature treats financing not as an ancillary act, but as a structural component of terrorist activity that warrants independent criminal liability. Consequently, organizational digital conduct—such as designing automated cryptocurrency transfer schemes, managing distributed wallets, or establishing chains of anonymous transactions—falls within the scope of this provision. Kerimov and Krasinsky emphasize that contemporary subversive and terrorist organizations utilize distributed network models wherein financial support is funneled through cryptographically secure services.

Within the digital environment, actions that establish the infrastructure for asset movement occupy a distinct position. These include providing technical maintenance for anonymized channels, ensuring the availability of cryptocurrency platforms, and operating resources that allow users to obscure transaction ownership. Akilova demonstrates that network attacks, breaches, and manipulations of digital infrastructure forge a new layer of terrorist activity; this layer supplements classical forms of violence and fosters hybrid models that combine physical and digital impact. Although such actions do not involve the direct transfer of funds, they ensure the technical viability of communication channels that render asset movements undetectable. The underlying challenge is that the qualification of such conduct has traditionally relied on a model where assistance is inherently tied to a tangible contribution to the commission of the offense.

Digital infrastructure dilutes this nexus. Assistance transitions into technological maintenance, encompassing a broad spectrum of operations from supporting software tools to administering distributed platforms. Naumenko demonstrates that non-fungible tokens (NFTs), as forms of digital property, possess characteristics that enable their deployment for concealing income and transferring value across distributed networks.

Within criminal law theory, complicity was traditionally understood to require an intellectual

contribution, presupposing that the actor possesses an awareness of the nature and trajectory of the underlying criminal conduct. Amid digitalization, this assumption warrants refinement. A significant portion of conduct affecting the capacity of terrorist organizations to sustain their financial apparatus is performed by individuals interacting with digital systems strictly at the level of technical procedures. Glushkov highlights that the regulatory ambiguity surrounding cryptocurrency status directly compromises the qualification of actions involving its deployment within illicit schemes.

The anonymity, multi-tiered structure, and decentralized nature of operations imply that a digital infrastructure participant may perform functions that objectively facilitate the financial support of terrorist activities without possessing a comprehensive awareness of the ultimate consequences. Concurrently, the very architecture of the digital environment enables conduct that falls outside the traditional complicity model yet significantly impacts the execution of the criminal mechanism. Pshenichnov identifies a nexus between financial flows and recruitment mechanisms, demonstrating that these processes become covert within the digital landscape, where recruitment is accompanied by the use of platforms designed to circumvent direct contact with intermediaries.

The technical framework of modern financial systems relies on a multitude of supporting links, each affecting the capacity to preserve transaction anonymity, ensure rapid processing speeds, and maintain network resilience against external oversight. Such conduct acquires criminal law relevance only when it exhibits a specific quality of participation within the broader scheme. However, the criteria required to differentiate routine digital manipulations from active participation in a terrorism financing system currently lack analytical clarity.

4. Theoretical Complexities of Proving Intent in Digital Transfers as an Element of Offense Qualification

The migration of financial transactions to

the digital environment has fundamentally altered the conceptualization of the *mens rea* in terrorism financing offenses. Within the digital realm, criminal intent ceases to be self-evident. A digital operation lacks overt external indicators that would inherently reveal the actor's underlying purpose, causing specific components of intent to dissolve within automated architectures.

The challenge of establishing intent stems from the multi-layered architecture of digital transactions. Structurally, a transaction appears as a routine technical operation, often executed automatically or via a user interface devoid of any markers indicating an illicit destination. Discerning the true purpose of such conduct requires assessing a complex matrix of data that remains largely inaccessible to the immediate participant. Furthermore, digital instruments enable the deployment of automated protocols that execute transactional chains independent of continuous human intervention, thereby complicating the retroactive reconstruction of the cognitive element of *mens rea*.

Examining the problems of special complicity, Sokolova notes that expertly defining an individual's role within a terrorist organization becomes increasingly complex amid digitalization, where a significant portion of conduct transitions into technical operations. Anonymization mechanisms introduce additional ambiguity into establishing *mens rea*. Anonymity conceals both the sender's identity and the underlying objective of the transaction. Furthermore, digital identity may diverge from the actual actor, while a transaction routes through multiple nodes, each logging strictly technical metrics. Consequently, the evidentiary material traditionally utilized to reconstruct intent—such as inter-participant contacts, the nexus between conduct and outcome, or indicia of preparation for asset delivery—is absent. The digital environment severs these connections, thereby complicating the reconstruction of the actor's mental state regarding the consequences.

Distinctions between an individual's actual conduct and the technical modality of a transaction

generate further challenges. While traditional financial acts possessed an overt physical character—such as delivering cash or executing a paper document—the subjective element lacks clear external manifestation within the digital realm. An individual's conduct is reduced to interface manipulation or data transmission to an automated system.

Further complications arise from the lack of distinct boundaries between accidental and purposeful digital conduct. The technological environment permits actions generated by a combination of automated algorithms, technical anomalies, or intermediary interventions. Consequently, determining whether an actor possessed actual awareness regarding the trajectory of a terrorism financing operation becomes problematic. Even when certain indicia point to a nexus between a transaction and an illicit outcome, the prosecution must prove that the subject knowingly intended this trajectory, rather than merely performing mechanical manipulations within a digital system.

The challenge of proving intent under digital conditions carries broader implications, signaling a transformation of the entire *mens rea* doctrine. Within the digital sphere, the cognitive element shifts into a category that demands a contextual analysis of the circumstances under which a transaction occurs. This reality necessitates evaluating digital network architectures, the function of automated tools, and the specific distribution of agency between the human actor and the system. Addressing the enhancement of criminal liability for financing, Shkhagapsoev and Tutukov argue that digital asset transfer mechanisms fundamentally alter the internal structure of the offense; this shift requires updating legal frameworks that remain predominantly tailored to traditional monetary transactions. Accordingly, the task of criminal law theory is to formulate a method for reconstructing intent when criminal behavior is completely decoupled from conventional manifestations.

Doctrine and Legislation Amid Digital Risks

An analysis of digital asset transfer mechanisms indicates that while the current construction of assistance to terrorist activity covers a wide spectrum of conduct, the digital ecosystem engenders forms of participation that resist traditional models of complicity. Within a distributed digital infrastructure, actions lose their conventional physical tangibility, and sequential technical operations obscure any causally significant contribution to the illicit outcome. Under these circumstances, the criminal justice system requires doctrinal and statutory refinements to preserve analytical certainty in offense qualification while simultaneously accounting for the unique parameters of the digital realm. For example, Yashin and Kim emphasize the nexus between money laundering and terrorism financing, which justifies evaluating legalization processes as components of a unified financial crime framework wherein digital instruments serve as channels for resource redistribution.

This problem manifests primarily through the diminished transparency regarding the functional role of the conduct. Technical operations enabling asset transfers or sustaining anonymized channels frequently emerge as the sole mechanisms driving financial support to terrorist organizations [12; 13]. However, the formal criteria of complicity fail to consistently differentiate these acts from non-criminal digital activity. Consequently, the boundaries between secondary assistance and the organization of financing become blurred, particularly when an actor engages with the digital ecosystem strictly at the level of technical procedures [14; 15]. Further complications stem from the lack of precise criteria required to reconstruct *mens rea* when a digital transaction lacks the overt behavioral indicators that traditionally grounded the analysis of criminal intent.

Addressing these challenges necessitates a refinement of both the theoretical apparatus and the statutory definition of assistance [16; 17]. One viable solution involves the normative integration of digital forms of facilitation as a distinct mode of

5. Future Trajectories for Criminal Law

complicity, which would allow the law to evaluate the functional role of a technical act independent of its physical manifestation [18; 19].

Alternatively, the legislature could introduce a dedicated provision into the Notes to Article 205.1 of the CC RF addressing assistance executed via digital instruments. This framework would enable regulatory and judicial authorities to account for the unique parameters of distributed transactions when determining qualifying elements and reconstructing the cognitive component of the actor's behavior. Either approach serves to reduce the pervasive ambiguity surrounding the evaluation of digital operations, thereby adapting liability mechanisms to the architectural realities of modern digital infrastructure.

6. Conclusion

This study indicates that digital asset transfer mechanisms radically transform the nature of socially dangerous conduct associated with

terrorism financing. Automated transaction chains, the lack of direct interaction among co-perpetrators, and the pervasive anonymity of the digital ecosystem render traditional models of actus reus, causation, and mens rea insufficient for analytical clarity. Under these conditions, refining the criminal law toolkit becomes imperative to ensure that the law retains its capacity to differentiate a routine technical procedure from legally operative assistance.

Resolving these issues requires either the statutory integration of provisions that explicitly delineate digital forms of facilitation, or a doctrinal clarification of the criteria used to interpret a technical act as an element of assistance based on its functional nexus to financing. Both approaches aim to mitigate the systemic ambiguity inherent in distributed digital networks, thereby aligning criminal law analysis with the operational realities of financial digitalization.

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Tarasov A.A. Criminal law risks of digitalization: the use of network communications and cryptocurrencies in terrorist financing. *Pravoprimenenie = Law Enforcement Review*, 2026, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 119–127. DOI: 10.52468/2542-1514.2026.10(3).119-127. (In Russ.).