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RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE FOR THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE STATE**

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The subject. The evolution of regulation of prosecutor's activity in Russian Constitution as well as the role of Prosecutor's Office in provision of national security and integrity are being considered.

The purpose of the article is to confirm or disprove hypothesis that the preservation of the Prosecutor's Office made it possible to prevent the destruction of the Russian Federation and protect the country's security from significant threats.

The methodology. The authors use a dialectical method as well as analysis and synthesis. An important role is given to formal legal interpretation of Russian Constitution and legal acts. The main results, scope of application. The question of who saved the Russian Prosecutor's Office from the attempt to liquidate it in the autumn of 1993 is being covered in detail. There was not even a mention of the Prosecutor's Office in the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation. The Prosecutor's Office was supposed to be replaced by the institution of authorized representatives of the President in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Chapter 7 of the Russian Constitution was called "Judicial Power" until 2014, and it lacked the word "prosecutor's office", which caused a lot of bewilderment in the scientific and educational literature and turned the content of Chapter 7 into a kind of mystery. The article reveals the role of Alexey I. Kazannik in preserving the Russian Prosecutor's Office. The authors of the article name the main threats to state security: duplication of the powers of the federal government and the lack of effective legal guarantees of their responsibility, asymmetry of Russian federalism. Asymmetry leads to uneven implementation of citizens' rights and freedoms and distrust of power. The criteria for assessing the scientific activities of universities established in 2013 also pose a threat to state security. Conclusions. President Vladimir Putin has preserved the integrity and sovereignty of Russia, enforced the principle of the supremacy of federal law and strengthens Russia's security with the help of the Prosecutor's Office. The authors propose measures to strengthen Russia's security: (1) introduce a competitive selection procedure for the post of Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation with the participation of civil society institutions, which would have the right to present candidates to the Federation Council; (2) adopt a federal law on the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation to avoid duplication of powers with the Russian Government and other authorities; (3) change the criteria for assessing the scientific activity of universities, established by the Ministry of Science of the Russian Federation.

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The article is dedicated to the memory of Alexey I. Kazannik, Professor of Dostoevsky Omsk State University, Former Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation (October 1993-April 1994) in connection with the upcoming 80th anniversary of the Scientist and Man (26.07.1941-02.06.2019)

1. Introduction: the end of the 1990s- Russia is on the verge of collapse

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s of the twentieth century became a geopolitical catastrophe, which was repeatedly recognized and emphasized later by Vladimir Putin. By the end of the 1990s, Russia was already on the verge of disintegration by the time it was headed by Vladimir Putin. Margaret Thatcher once called the USSR "The Upper Volta with atomic missiles", which was one of the ideological labels with which the West waged a cold war with the USSR. But by the end of the 1990s, Russia was also disarmed, not only ideologically, but also in a military sense. But-the most important thing! – by the end of the 1990s, a single legal space was being destroyed in Russia, without which the integrity, unity and national security of the state, as well as ensuring its sovereignty, are impossible.

By this time, in one third of the subjects of the Russian Federation, the legislation contradicted the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, which, in fact, is the beginning of the collapse of the country. In other words, Russia could well share the fate of the USSR, breaking up into "sovereign" republics, which declared themselves not only the former autonomies of the USSR, but also some regions whose leadership wanted to have the same powers and privileges as the newly-born presidents of the republics.

The norm according to which "The Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws have supremacy throughout the territory of the Russian Federation" (Part 2 of Article 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation) was violated with impunity, and even prosecutors, who were more dependent on regional elites than on the President of the Russian Federation, were powerless. The fact is that the constitutional norm in force at that time and reformed only in 2014: "Prosecutors of the subjects of the Russian

Federation are appointed by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation in agreement with its subject" (part 3 of Article 129 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as amended until 2014). Thus, in fact, the "co-ordinated" prosecutors of the regions, if they were not the proteges of the heads of the regions (and often it was the latter who selected the prosecutor from local cadres), then they largely depended on them, became "manual" prosecutors. All this led to the fact that the regions formed their own "regional legality".

In addition, there were no procedural norms in the legislation that allowed prosecutors to submit submissions to the court on the recognition of regional normative acts that contradict the laws of the Russian Federation as invalid and not subject to application.

2. The era of sovereignization is over. The role of President Vladimir Putin in preserving the integrity of the Russian State

V. V. Putin became a powerful obstacle in the way of the central opposition forces that were tearing the country apart, for which he used the "sleeping" norm of the Constitution, according to which the President of the Russian Federation "takes measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity..." (part 2 of Article 80 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation).

The Samara region can be proud of the fact that the policy of bringing the legislation of the subjects of the Russian Federation in line with federal legislation was announced on the Samara land. At the end of August 2000, a particularly unnoticed, but very important political event occurred: during a working trip to Togliatti, Vladimir Putin put a fat end to the history of the Yeltsin era of sovereignties.

3. The Institute of Plenipotentiary

representatives of the President of the Russian Federation as a failed alternative to the Prosecutor's Office

However, the powers of the representatives of the President of the Russian Federation in the federal districts overlap with the competence of his authorized representatives in the subjects of the Federation. Actually, the institution of Presidential plenipotentiary representatives in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation (clause "k" of Article 83 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation) appeared in the text of the Constitution because in the final draft prepared for publication (the draft was published on 10.11.1993), there was no prosecutor's office at all as an authority, and only the Prosecutor General A. I. Kazannik, who On November 9, 1993, Yeltsin managed to convince the president that the prosecutor's office should not be destroyed, and asked to include in the draft at least one of the versions of the article on the prosecutor's office proposed by him, as a result of which a short version was hastily inserted into the chapter "Judicial Power". At the same time, those who introduced article 129 into the draft chapter 7 of the Constitution did not think to change the title of the chapter by including the word "prosecutor's office" in it.

The "mistake" was corrected only in 2014, when Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation was called "The Judiciary and the Prosecutor's Office" with the simultaneous strengthening of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation, including with regard to the appointment and dismissal of prosecutors of the subjects of the Russian Federation, which was previously within the competence of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation (in parentheses, we note that this is far from the only legal strengthening of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation: there are already about five hundred new presidential powers that have appeared in the current legislation).

4. Who saved the Prosecutor's Office of Russia from the planned liquidation?

In the draft Constitution, which was sent to the set on November 9, 1993, there was not even

such a word – "prosecutor's office", because the authors of the new constitution intended to replace it with the institution of authorized representatives of the President in the subjects of the Russian Federation. The personnel apparatus of the prosecutor's office was also supposed to go to them, authorized representatives, but only in its "loyal" part.

In our opinion, the institution of Presidential plenipotentiaries in the constituent entities of the Federation, which still had some meaning under Yeltsin, in the conditions of direct elections of heads of regions, when the election was won by henchmen of financial and industrial groups independent of the President of the Russian Federation, leaders of national clans and even, which was extremely rare, national idols (for example, Mikhail Evdokimov), after the abolition of direct elections of heads of regions, the institute of Presidential plenipotentiaries in the constituent entities of the Federation becomes a decorative and duplicating vestige. By the way, this circumstance was not too affected by the return of direct elections of governors, especially since the municipal filter turned these elections into a plebiscite on approval/disapproval of presidential candidates.

Who saved the Russian prosecutor's office from the planned liquidation? N. A. Bobrova, based on a personal conversation with Professor A. I. Kazannik of Omsk State University in April 2018 (she was an official opponent at the defense of the PhD thesis of S. V. Ivanov, a graduate student of A. I. Kazannik), as well as on the basis of studying the published interview of A. I. Kazannik, comes to the conclusion that "one person saved the prosecutor's office – Alexey Ivanovich Kazannik. Being the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation at the time of drafting the Constitution, A. I. Kazannik, having learned that there was no article about the prosecutor's office in the draft constitution, got a reception from Boris Yeltsin a few hours before the publication of the draft and managed to convince him that the prosecutor's office could not be liquidated, because in this case he would remain in history as the ruler who destroyed the prosecutor's office, while it was created by Peter I, with whom the people compare Yeltsin. This innocent flattery allowed A. I. Kazannik

to save the prosecutor's office for Russia!" [2, p. 29].

On the same night, a short version of article 129 on the prosecutor's office was inserted into the already drawn-up draft of the constitution (A. I. Kazannik put two options before Yeltsin - a detailed one and a short one).

As an example, we will quote from the textbook on constitutional law by S. A. Avakyan: "The existence of the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation is provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In its chapter 7 "Judicial power" there is only one article (Article 129) devoted to the prosecutor's office, which is very vague about the status and appointment of the prosecutor's office. On the one hand, the placement of the article in Chapter 7 raises many questions – it turns out that the prosecutor's office is part of the judiciary. (...) the prosecutor's office does not have the function of making court decisions (...) the prosecutor's office interacts with the court to a greater extent than other subjects of law. And yet, this does not make it part of the judicial power, which is why the conclusion about the prosecutor's office as an independent branch of state power in the Russian Federation is permissible" [3, p.731].

Yes, indeed, the prosecutor's office was preserved as the only effective institution of state power, a state tool that allowed Vladimir Putin in 2000 to launch and brilliantly implement a policy of restoring a unified federal legality, to stop the policy of splitting the legality into "Kaluga and Kazan", "Bashkir and Altai".

It was the prosecutor's office, on behalf of V. V. Putin, that quickly brought the charters and laws of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation into compliance with the Constitution and federal legislation. "The unprecedented step of the Head of Russia stopped the centrifugal processes". In fact, the situation by the end of the 90s was so alarming, and the centrifugal forces were so strong that the integrity of Russia was already under threat, which was threatened by the fate of the Soviet Union, because the rampant destruction of the unified legal space of Russia seemed to be irreversible.

Moreover, some regional leaders have

already brought the ideological base under their regulations that contradict federal laws. For example, the Governor of the Samara region, K. A. Titov, speaking on 4.07.1999 in Samara at the congress of the Union of Legislators of Russia, said that "because of the current situation, the regional authorities are simply forced to violate the law."

By the end of the 1990s, the unified legal space of Russia was significantly destroyed. In addition, through the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the separatists lobbied for a Resolution of June 16, 1996, according to which the courts of general jurisdiction cannot consider cases on the contradiction of regional normative acts to federal laws due to the lack of a procedure for considering these cases. The legalization of the legal lawlessness of the regions was carried out [1].

The people had already experienced one geopolitical catastrophe, having lost the USSR, but a new one was coming, and it was already necessary to save Russia, which Vladimir Putin did, starting a policy of bringing regional regulations into line with federal legislation.

I would like to quote from the book by N. A. Bobrova: "Three monuments should be erected in front of the General Prosecutor's Office: Peter the Great as the creator of the "sovereign's eye", Alexey Kazannik as a person thanks to whom the Russian prosecutor's Office was not destroyed, and Vladimir Putin as the President, who reminded regional tsars and prosecutors of the principle of the supremacy of federal legislation. The president, with the help of the prosecutor's office, restored the unified legal space of Russia and thereby preserved Russia" [2, p. 32].

On June 2, 2019, A. I. Kazannik passed away. The book by N. A. Bobrova was published on June 7. Only Alexey Ivanovich's widow and sons saw it.

Perhaps, in the history of Russia, there has never been and will never be a Prosecutor General who has been in this position for less than six months and who has managed to do so much. By the way, after the rescue of the prosecutor's office, he released the members of the State Emergency Committee from Lefortovo, and after that he voluntarily submitted a resignation report (at the same time, he never moved into the Moscow apartment provided to him and returned to Omsk

State University).

5. Evolution of Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation regarding the status of the Prosecutor's Office and strengthening the influence of the Presidential power on it

Chapter 7 acquired its current name "The Judiciary and the Prosecutor's Office" as a result of the amendments of 2014, but it is unlikely that the initiators of the amendments were guided by the need to bring the title of the chapter in line with its content, about which the constitutionalists have written many pages. The opinion of scientists worried the authorities least of all, and the chapter would have had an inadequate name for its content for a long time if it had not needed another strengthening of the vertical of presidential power.

Part 3 of Article 129 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation read: "Prosecutors of the subjects of the Russian Federation are appointed by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation in coordination with its subjects," and part 4 of Article 129 read: "Other prosecutors are appointed by the prosecutor of the Russian Federation."

As a result of the 2014 reform, Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation were appointed and dismissed not by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation himself, but in the same order in which the Prosecutor General is appointed and dismissed, namely: Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation are appointed and dismissed by the Federation Council on the proposal of the President of the Russian Federation.

As a result of the reform-2020, the Federation Council is responsible for conducting consultations on candidates proposed by the President of the Russian Federation for the post of Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, prosecutors of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, prosecutors of military and other specialized prosecutor's offices equated to prosecutors of constituent entities of the Russian Federation (clause "z" of Article 102 of the

Constitution of the Russian Federation). The President of the Russian Federation appoints all these prosecutors.

This is the evolution of the title of Chapter 7 and the content of Article 129 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which indicates the gradual strengthening of the centralization of the prosecutor's office on the basis of the "presidential core", the presidential power, which allows using a centralized prosecutor's office to strengthen the integrity, unity and security of Russia.

6. Threats to the integrity and unity of Russia and guarantees of their minimization

S. V. Ivanov, a graduate student of A. I. Kazannik, devoted his dissertation to the guarantees of the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. In particular, he drew attention to the problem of duplication of state functions and gave concrete examples of how constitutional competition between the highest state authorities can create a state of dual power – the strongest threat to the unity and territorial integrity of the country [4, p. 41, 43].

By the way, S. M. Shakhrai saw a threat to the stability of Russia in the constitutional reform-2020, believing that the amendments provoke "semiboyarism". In his opinion, as a result of the reform, several centers of constitutional influence are emerging, which in the future will become a platform for an open political struggle of economic clans, that is, a mine is being laid for the stability of Russia. He, in particular, saw such a "mine" both in the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and in both chambers of the Federal Assembly, which can hardly be agreed with, because the belittlement of the Constitutional Court has been brought to the last line by the amendments, and the formation of the Federation Council depends to a great extent on the President. As for the State Duma, whose powers allegedly increase significantly when forming a Government, this, in our opinion, is only an appearance.

A serious problem is only the duplication of the powers of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, the President of the Russian Federation and the State Council of the Russian

Federation, which in the future really creates the risk of a situation of dual power that is incompatible with the unity of the state power of Russia and threatens its territorial integrity.

In no case should we allow the "regionalization" of the prosecutor's office with the subordination of prosecutors to the state authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation (unfortunately, this trend is still observed in different regions and to varying degrees). In the regions, for example, such "little things" are common, such as awarding prosecutor's employees and judges on the occasion of the Lawyer's Day and in connection with various other events with awards of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

We believe that prosecutors and judges can only be awarded federal awards, since prosecutors serve only the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal legislation.

Undoubtedly, it should be considered a gap that neither the Constitution of the Russian Federation nor the Federal Law "On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation" contains any mention of the Prosecutor General as the subject of an appeal to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on the violation of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation. The gap is also the fact that the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation does not have the right to legislative initiative on issues of conducting the prosecutor's office. Understanding why this happened (according to the plan of the creators of the Constitution, the prosecutor's office should have disappeared altogether), we all the more insist that this historical mistake should be corrected.

Article 10 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation should be formulated in such a way that it implies the unity of state power in its division not into "sub-powers" as parts, but into "branches as functions". However, the Constitution of the Russian Federation bears the imprint of the presidential decree law that preceded its adoption.

S. V. Ivanov negatively assesses the amendments of the federal legislator of 28.06.2014, which allow combining the powers of a deputy of the regional parliament and the

Federation Council (in the second paragraph of Article 9 of Section two "Final and Transitional provisions" of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, members of the Federation Council are called deputies of the Federation Council, in accordance with the reform-2020, they will now be called senators). The amendments were adopted in order to eliminate the need for additional elections as a result of granting the powers of a member of the Federation Council to a deputy of the legislative body elected by a single-mandate electoral body. In his opinion, "the organizational presence of any of the chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation as part of the legislative body of a subject of the Russian Federation does not contribute to the independence of the latter" [4, p.176]. However, this problem should also be looked at from the other side, especially knowing how it arose in general (when there was a norm on the appointment of a member of the Federation Council only from among persons who have ever been elected to representative authorities of any level). This "organizational presence" does not so much weaken the region, as it strengthens its lobbying capabilities and organizational ties with the Center. Other senators rarely appear in the region they represent, and here the very necessity forces them to regularly visit the region and be imbued with its interests at meetings of the regional legislative assembly, deputy receptions and meetings with voters, etc.

A much greater threat to state security is the asymmetry of the Russian Federation, which actually has no limits and reaches very dangerous values in all parameters [5; 6; 7], including budget [8]. According to the best expert on the Far East, ex-President of Yakutia, adviser to the Federation Council on the Far East V. A. The protest rallies that swept through the Khabarovsk Territory in connection with the resignation of the governor of the region, Sergei Furgal, were not so much rallies in his defense, as they marked the boiling point of discontent among the Far East with the state's policy towards the Far East and Siberia as a whole.

Scientists paid special attention to the constitutional and legal responsibility of the subjects of the Russian Federation in terms of state security [9; 10; 11. This responsibility is also called federal

responsibility or responsibility in federal relations [12; 13; 14]. The scientists also paid attention to the constitutional responsibility of the state authorities of the subjects of the Federation [15; 16] and their top officials [17; 18], as well as to the relevant torts in these areas.

Even under the Soviet regime, the constitutional and legal responsibility of state authorities was recognized and studied, as well as the responsibility of state authorities of the Russian Federation is being studied now [19; 20; 21], including the President of the Russian Federation [22] and the state as a whole.

The state can be a subject of legal responsibility either in the international legal aspect, or in the broad constitutional aspect, if it means the responsibility of the state to the people, to the individual, as well as in the proper legal aspect, if it means the responsibility of the state for causing harm to individuals and legal entities through the fault of state bodies and officials. Therefore, most often, with some exceptions [23], scientists study not the constitutional responsibility of the state to the individual and the people, which has a philosophical and even sacred meaning [24, p. 37], but the responsibility of individual state authorities and officials. But in any case, such responsibility is refracted through the prism of state security [25], even if we are talking about the need to strengthen local self-government [26] or even problems arising in the implementation of human and civil rights [27], because the number of citizens. those who do not have a real opportunity to exercise their rights and freedoms are extremely high and extremely critical in terms of state security, public confidence in the authorities.

There are always politicians and scientists who claim the equal, "joint" responsibility of civil society and the state in ensuring the rule of law, the realization of human and civil rights, but shifting the blame and "smearing" the responsibility of state bodies and officials on the whole society according to the notorious phrase that society has the government that it deserves, is a convenient position for those responsible for the state of legality in a particular area of power and management.

7. The destructive influence of modern criteria for evaluating the scientific activities of Russian universities on the interests and sovereignty of Russia

Many scientists have written and spoken at scientific conferences about the harmfulness of the criteria for evaluating the scientific activity of universities, established by the Appendix to the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation No. 1324 of 10.12.2013 [29; 30]. In this Application, the priority of publications in foreign journals and publications indexed in the Scopus and Web of Science citation databases is fixed, and, regardless of specialization, which has particularly hurt the humanities, including legal sciences. At the time of the appearance of these odious criteria in Russia, there was not a single legal journal indexed in these databases, by the way, administered by private firms that earn money on this. At the moment, only seven Russian law journals are assigned to these citation bases, but this is a drop in the bucket. What does this lead to? The article of a Russian scientist in a Malaysian, Filipino or Spanish journal is valued higher than his own article in such excellent journals as "Constitutional and Municipal Law", "State and Law", "Law Enforcement" and many other domestic journals, although many Russian specialists, graduate students and students will read them, and most likely only a few in the Malaysian and Philippine journal.

Universities are forced to adopt local regulations in accordance with the guidelines of the relevant Ministry, which provide higher scores for articles in Scopus and Web of Science. Accordingly, each university sets its own standards for paying teachers for articles in Scopus and Web of Science. At the same time, no other articles or even solid monographs are encouraged in the material sense.

In addition to higher evaluation of articles in Scopus and Web of Science, universities are given additional points for the presence of foreign scientists and specialists in the faculty of the university, and even its management. The latter circumstance directly discriminates against Russian scientists and, moreover, infringes on Russia's sovereignty. In some universities, foreign scientists have been massively registered as part-timers. Often, in fact, they are only "registered" and receive

a salary, and their academic load is carried out by a Russian teacher.

In addition, this Order gives advantages in financing to those universities that train employees to earn money for the university. The R&D standards for teachers are set at 50-100-200 thousand rubles per year. Teachers must necessarily either win grants for the required amount, or conclude economic and consulting contracts with legal entities where the third party (the beneficiary) is the university. If the teacher does not comply with the R & D standards, he is deprived of the award, and may not extend the contract with the university for a new period.

Even in the United States, there are different criteria for evaluating the scientific merits of teaching staff at different departments, since theoretical lawyers and historians cannot be equated with civil lawyers and criminologists if possible, for example, concluding contracts with various consulting firms, developing regulatory legal acts, and so on.

Along with the unjustified leveling of "physicists" and "lyricists" in the aspect of evaluating their scientific achievements, another seemingly opposite process is taking place, but equally fraught with threats to national security. We are talking about granting a certain list of universities the right not only to award academic degrees themselves, but also to develop and approve a "list of scientific fields and specialties". S. V. Narutto showed what liberties and violations of the law this leads to by the example of the Higher School of Economics, whose order violates the current legislation [31].

Returning to the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science on the evaluation of scientific achievements of universities, it should be emphasized that it actually leveled the degrees of candidate and Doctor of sciences (the university is evaluated by the total number of degrees without graduation into doctoral and candidate degrees), which is a clear infringement of the interests of professors, especially professors of the Soviet school, which is also a discriminatory circumstance, but already by age and merit. The order gives preference to young scientists, since the university receives additional points not for scientific schools

and venerable professors, but for professors younger than 35-40 years. There are more young doctors and professors in physical-mathematical and other natural disciplines. However, in the humanities, the picture is different. It takes 15-25 years for a university to raise a professor. Each professor is a name, an achievement of the university. In other countries, the status of a professor has long been raised to the proper height. At one time, Professor A. I. Kazannik was on an internship in Germany and was amazed that up to four paid assistants are attached to each professor. In Germany, the salary scale of the teaching staff depends on the salary of the professor, and the word "professor" is put in the professor's passport. And it is customary to address such a citizen with the word "professor".

The described problems in the system of regulation of personnel training objectively require attention from the prosecutor's office.

8. Conclusions and recommendations.

1) The Constitution of the Russian Federation should list such principles of the work of the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation as centralization, independence from any authorities and public associations, supervision of compliance with and execution of federal laws as the exclusive function of the prosecutor's office. 2) It is necessary to prevent any symptoms of "regionalization" of the prosecutor's office with the reassignment of prosecutors to the state authorities of the regions. 3) It is necessary to prohibit awarding prosecutors and judges with regional and municipal awards. 4) It is required to grant the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation the right of legislative initiative in the State Duma of the Russian Federation. 5) The Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation and the prosecutors of the constituent entities of the Federation should be given the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the interests of citizens and their collectives. 6) It is necessary to introduce a competitive selection procedure for the post of Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation with the participation of civil society institutions that would have the right to submit candidates to the Federation Council (this proposal has already been made [8, p.183]). 7) Every

Russian prosecutor, from the General to the most ordinary, should know the history of the attempt to liquidate the Prosecutor's Office of Russia in the fall of 1993 and the name of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation A. I. Kazannik, who managed to save the prosecutor's office. 8) Every Russian prosecutor should read the interview of A. I. Kazannik to the correspondent of TASS [3]. 9) We consider it appropriate to ask the leadership of Omsk State University to send an appeal to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation and the President of the Russian Federation about the installation of a monument to A. I. Kazannik (the authors of this article also intend to do this together with Professor N. A. Bobrova and other representatives of the scientific community). 10) It is urgently necessary to adopt the federal law "On the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation" in order to avoid duplication of powers with the Government of the Russian Federation and other authorities. 11) All proposals to guarantee the unity, integrity and security of Russia should be studied in order to consolidate the most valuable of them in legislation and prevent the weakening of the unity and security of Russia. 12) The criteria for evaluating the scientific activity of universities, established by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation by Order No. 1324 of 10.12.2013, should be changed as contrary to the state interests of Russia and its sovereignty. 13) It is necessary to abolish the right of universities that have received the right to award academic degrees to develop and approve a list of scientific fields and specialties themselves.

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