

GLOBAL MENTAL SHIFT: POLITICAL VALUES OF THE YOUTH OF RUSSIA AND EUROPE**

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The subject of the article is the political values of the youth of Russia and Europe.

The purpose of our study is to identify the political values of the Youth of Russia and Europe and conduct a comparative analysis based on the methodology of comparative analysis. Four hypotheses are tested that suggest the values of young people, regardless of the region or country of residence, are common, despite the differences in forms of government, political culture, living standards and traditions of the respondents. The main research tasks were:

1. Identification of common value orientations of modern youth studying at universities.
2. Determination of the type of cultural mentality (according to the methodology of Russian American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin) of the youth of Russia and European countries included in the sample.
3. Determining the place of politics and the opportunity to participate in policymaking in the system of values of today's youth.
4. Identification of attitudes (loyalty / acceptance / non-acceptance) to modern democratic values, as well as identification of the preferred form of political governance among young people.
5. Determination of the desired type of taxation.
6. Establishing the relationship between political values and quality of life.
7. Determining the understanding of the components of happiness (wellbeing) and the meaning of life of modern youth.
8. Diagnosis of the degree of involvement in politics/apathy of today's youth.

The main results, scope of application. Study made it possible to introduce into contemporary science a new term "integral model of values" – an interconnected set of several life values of a person, each of which describes individual components of values, to form a complete and comprehensive idea of the value system of certain social groups. Empirical study made it possible to identify the basic components of the integral model of values of modern youth in Russia and Europe in a comparative aspect. Under the integral model of values, authors mean an interconnected set of several private value models of a person (mentality, basic human and social values, life satisfaction and a subjective feeling of happiness, political views and actions, cultural values, etc.), each of which describes individual components of values, and all together they form a complete and comprehensive idea of the value system of certain social groups. In the structure of the integral model of youth values, authors included: mentality, political values, political mobility and a system of universal values. In accordance with this structure, we present the results of our study.

8. Conclusions. Authors not only managed to identify the already established values and, on the basis of them, draw up an integration model of the values of the youth of Russia and Europe through their comparison, but also to determine the needs of today's youth for certain values.

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1. Introduction.

Values in general and political values in particular have been the subject of research by many scientists in different countries and regions for several decades. In Europe and the USA, since approximately 1980, and in Russia, a decade later, the number of such studies has grown rapidly. Every 10 years, the European Values Study (EVS)¹ conducts similar studies with the publication of results and open data. Every five years the international research program World Values Survey WVS², created in 1981, researchers the social, political, economic, religious and cultural values of people around the world. In Russia, the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research³ also regularly conducts polls on values among various groups of the population, in addition to similar research carried out for quite a long time by the Public Opinion Foundation⁴ and the Levada - Center⁵. All the results of these and many other studies are available on the pages of scientific journals, on websites and on open data platforms.

The study of political values is directly related to the concept of "trust". Trust in political power, in specific institutions, in political leaders, in domestic and foreign policy, etc. [1-6].

Gvozdanović [2] explores the political values of Croatian student youth, viewing them through the prism of interrelations of interest in politics and the value of self-expression, political preferences and evaluation of the democratic functioning of the political system. While the statement of Wu and Wilkes [7] is

true, the answers obtained by surveys on trust or distrust in institutions such as the government, parliament, civil service, and political parties, the question remains - do respondents trust the entire system, or individual institutions? Is distrust a critically framed conviction, or a manifestation of general cynicism? Do respondents end up supporting the policies of their governments or not?

Under "political values" in different periods, scientists implied different concepts. In the early 2000s, political values strongly depend on party preferences [8], and the basis of personality determined political behavior [9; 10]. At the same time, it is important to distinguish between political values and political attitudes. While values are more stable, Connors [11] rightly argues that political values have a social dimension, that is, people accept the political values of those around them, and therefore values can be subject to change. We, following Samsonova, understand **political values** as a set of ideas, experiences and feelings that determine people's behavior in situations related to politics [12, p.142].

Methods for researching the value orientations of young people were formulated and structured by Samsonova [12], who argues that the sociological survey method remains the universal and most effective way to measure political values. Indeed, the previous studies of the value orientations of young people that we have reviewed are based, as a rule, on surveys. However, Ross [16] disputes the effectiveness of this method, opposing it to the in-depth interview method, when the respondent's deep knowledge, life experience and motives come to the surface.

Since we, as already mentioned, did not find comparative studies of the political values of young people in the literature available to us, we were interested in the results of sociological

¹ <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/>

² <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>

³ <https://wciom.ru>

⁴ <https://fom.ru/TSennosti>

⁵ <https://www.levada.ru/>

surveys, firstly, of the political preferences of people in general, especially those studies in which there was a clear cut for young people (18-35 years). Secondly, we were interested in studies of the value orientations of young people, since they almost always included questions related to politics and attitudes towards it (EVS/WVS, 2021).

The purpose of our study is to identify the political values of the Youth of Russia and Europe and conduct a comparative analysis based on the methodology of comparative analysis.

Research objectives were:

1. Identification of common value orientations of modern youth studying at universities.

2. Determination of the type of cultural mentality (according to the methodology of Russian-American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin) of the youth of Russia and European countries included in the sample.

3. Determining the place of politics and the opportunity to participate in policymaking in the system of values of today's youth.

In our study, we took respondents not just young people of a certain age, we focused on studying youth, students of higher scientific institutions both in Europe and in Russia. This was primarily due to the results of previous studies [4; 3; 14], showing that the processing of complex information from various sources, the process of determining, comprehending and formulating values are mainly inherent in people with an education above average. However, Hogden and Webb [15] rightly point out that an additional difficulty in working with young people in the field of education is that they too often work with closed questions during knowledge tests, so they unwittingly feel compelled to find the right answer rather than express their own ideas.

Kolczynska [4] explores the links between education, democratic values, and

political trust and concludes that although education is positively associated with democratic values regardless of the country's level of democracy, this link is much stronger in democratic countries than in non-democratic ones. The same correlation between education and institutional trust, satisfaction with a democratic regime follows from Hakhverdian and Mayne [17] and Monsiváis-Carrillo and Cantú Ramos [18].

A study by Petukhov [19] shows that, despite a decline from 2013 to 2018. The number of politically indifferent young Russians increased. That is, more than half of the young people aged 18 to 34 being surveyed, consider social justice to be the fundamental value orientation for Russia (59%).

Of interest is Karaidyshev's study [20], which revealed that self-sufficiency of thinking and freedom of creativity turned out to be the highest value of Russian youth. And almost 10 years later, Bogdan's study [21] - reveals the political values of residents of 42 constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the emotional attitude towards these values, showed that the emotional component of the representation of political values is an expression of deeper processes in the political consciousness of the population and strongly associated with political culture.

The interest of recent years in youth issues has most often focused on the political context, primarily due to the society's demand for change, especially in Russia [19; 22-25]. Many researchers talk about the transformation of socio-political values in the European Union [26; 27], while observing a shift in people's preferences towards authoritarianism [14].

In this regard, it was interesting for the authors to study the value orientations of the youth of Russia and Europe by checking similar sections of 2017-2018⁶, when the inhabitants of

⁶ <https://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/maptool.html>

Russia showed less commitment to the ideals of democracy compared to the young inhabitants of European countries.⁷

2. Typology of P. Sorokin's mentality in the logic of the sociological study of political values

In our study we relied on the typology introduced into sociology by Pitirim Sorokin, namely, the three basic mentalities he pointed out: ideational, sensual and idealistic. According to the empirically proven theory of P. Sorokin, these three mentalities replace each other, canceling the theory of evolution and returning the theory of cyclicity to the understanding of the development of society. The theory of cyclical development has become the basis of the postmodern understanding of contemporary society. Let us briefly characterize each of the three mentalities that we have taken as a basis.

Ideational mentality - the predominance of spiritual values in society. The needs of people, carriers of the ideational mentality, are predominantly spiritual. The way to satisfy needs is self-control, work on consciousness or prayer (depending on the dominant ideology). Thus, it is not reality that changes, but the attitude towards it, its perception [28].

Sensual cultural mentality is the opposite of ideational. The criterion of the value of materialistic sensual culture is the satisfaction of basic desires, the priority of which are good food, sex, and entertainment. The main concern of the sensual society is to get the maximum pleasure for the minimum price. The entire second half of the 20th century is a consumer society, this is the heyday of a sensual society [29].

The idealistic type of mentality is a harmonious combination of sincere faith in

God/gods/transcendental and acceptance of the material world, the improvement and development of which is as important as self-development. Material needs in the idealistic mentality are subordinated to spiritual needs. As a rule, the idealistic mentality replaces the sensual mentality. Looking ahead, let's say that this is exactly what happened at present time.

Youth as an object of study

Despite the fact that the concept of "youth" is widely used, there is still no unambiguous approach to the interpretation of this term in scientific research. It is clear that young people are a special group, with certain age characteristics, a certain social position and social status [30].

In other words, young people are a socio-demographic group that we have identified on the basis of age characteristics, social status, which depends on the social system, culture, patterns of socialization, and education of a given society. Specifically, *in our study, young people are students of European and Russian universities of various faculties and forms of education aged 17 to 36 and older who do not have economic independence.*

In determining the mentality of today's youth, we relied on the methodology of the Russian-American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, who in the XX-th century conducted a full-scale study of mentalities from the 5th century BC until the XX-th century. When characterizing mentalities, P. Sorokin pointed out the main parameters for their characteristics, which were also integrated and adapted by us into the questionnaire. Thus, based on the results of the study, we, continuing the theory of mentality fluctuations by Pitirim Sorokin, will characterize the modern mentality based on the data obtained and according to the criteria identified by the classic sociology.

3. Hypotheses

Based on the analysis of available publications devoted to research on the values

⁷ <https://i0.wp.com/europeanvaluesstudy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/democracy.jpg?ssl=1>

of young people, primary data from open sources⁸, we put forward a number of hypotheses that formed the basis of our study:

Hypothesis 1. The political values of the Russian and European Youth differ very little: the common values of freedom of speech, self-expression, freedom of movement, and the opportunity to participate in elections are shared by the youth of all countries. Thus, we can divide young people based on the difference of opinion rather than geolocation. This is also a feature of the XXI-st century, where geographical boundaries have ceased to matter, and like-minded people are united by similarity of views, and not by geolocation.

As a consequence of this, we see the same level of apoliticality among the youth of Russia and Europe.

Hypothesis 2. Today's youth, both in Russia and in Europe, does not articulate the values of democracy in a complex, but expresses a request only for some of them. The emphasis is on those that provide young people with stability and security.

Hypothesis 3. Considering value orientations within the framework of the theory and methodology of P. Sorokin, there is a transition from *sensual* (roughly materialistic mentality aimed at obtaining pleasure and conquering the world) to *idealistic* mentality (representing the balance of sensual and spiritual mentality, the emphasis in the meaning of life and development is shifting from external to internal, harmonious relations with the world are as important as external attributes of success, etc.). In this regard, we assumed that contemporary youth puts

personal values (self-development, creativity, free time) above public values.

4. Research methodology.

Our comparative study was a comparison of the political values of young people living in Europe and in the Russian Federation using the method of a sociological survey (conducted online). This methodology made it possible to identify the general and the particular in the palette of political values of today's youth and made it possible to analyze the causes and effects. A two-stage quota sample was used with a probabilistic selection of respondents within the quota.

The sample was 2% of the general population, the sociological error was 1.3%.

The total sample size was 1279 respondents:

- students of Russian universities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kaliningrad, Omsk, etc.) - 642 respondents,
- students of European universities (Serbia, Spain, Greece, Latvia, etc.) - 637 respondents.

Thus, the universities are evenly represented in the quota sample, and the research group could not influence the probabilistic sample and its gender and age composition, it was formed based on the free will of the respondents to participate in the survey. Nevertheless, for us, as researchers, the degree of activity of respondents in a particular university in a particular country was also indicative.

The peculiarities of the external environment of the ongoing study were that it began to be carried out in the conditions of an ending pandemic, and ended in the conditions of the beginning of a special military operation in Ukraine. Thus, the youth of Russia and Europe survived the end of the pandemic, leaving it with an updated system of values and entered the time period of military, sanctions and political information confrontation. Also, external

⁸ <https://osf.io/945yj/>,
https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA7500?doi=10.4232/1.13897,
<https://wciom.ru/ratings/protestnyi-potencial>,
<https://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/maptool.html>, et al.

conditions led to some limitations that influenced the course of the study:

1. Some groups of students were still on distance learning, so it was extremely difficult to provide a quota sample. The sampling method was changed to probabilistic selection.

2. The entire period of our study was influenced by the events that began in February 2014, as a result of which certain politically charged surveys were blocked both by many Russian universities and by universities in Europe. This led to a bias in the second stage of the sample, namely the probabilistic selection within universities. For example, Serbian students were significantly more in the sample, willing to answer questions than Spanish or Greek students. This is due to the political information policy within each country and, accordingly, the desire/unwillingness of students to cooperate with researchers from Russia.

5. Results⁹

Our empirical study made it possible to identify the basic components of the *integral model of values* of modern youth in Russia and Europe in a comparative aspect. Under the integral model of values, we mean an interconnected set of several private value models of a person (mentality, basic human and social values, life satisfaction and a subjective feeling of happiness, political views and actions, cultural values, etc.), each of which describes individual components of values, and all together they form a complete and comprehensive idea of the value system of certain social groups.

In the structure of the integral model of youth values, we included: mentality, political values, political mobility and a system of universal values. In accordance with this structure, we present the results of our study.

5.1. The prevailing mentality among the youth of Russia and Europe.

Our questionnaire was compiled in such a way that different questions (closed, semi-open, open questions, including questions that model behavior in a given situation) come to a full description of not only the modern mentality according to P. Sorokin's typology, but also give a detailed description of the concept of the integral model of values introduced by us.

For example, in one of the questions, we asked respondents to **choose one answer option in the life values presented for choice**. As we have already mentioned, when determining the basic values of a real socio-cultural mentality, we used the methodology P. Sorokin, which determined the answers variables.

The answers of the respondents were distributed as follows:

1) **Spiritual:** self-development, self-realization and self-improvement, our consciousness determines our life, therefore we need to work on ourselves, self-development as the meaning of life (a sense of inner harmony with oneself and the world, harmonious relationships and self-realization in the profession, the possibility of creativity - as success criteria) - **16%** are students of European universities and **15%** are students of Russian universities.

2) **Both spiritual and material:** self-development and self-improvement, as well as success in a career and business, creating a happy family, achieving high well-being (criteria for success - an inner feeling of harmony with oneself and the world, supported by financial prosperity and the approval of society) - **81%** respondents from Russian universities and **79%** of respondents from universities in European countries.

3) **Material:** the main thing is to be successful and make good money, this is both the meaning of life and the criterion for its

⁹ For complete survey results, see DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.10130.32961

success (bank account and the number of subscribers are quantitative indicators of success). Only **4%** of respondents from Russian universities chose this option and **5%** of respondents from European universities preferred it.

The answer to this question made it possible to establish the general priorities of the values of our respondents, which is necessary for further understanding and interpretation of the results in relation to political values.

Based on the results of the study, which are almost identical among the students of Russian and European universities, we can state that such a change in mentality has already occurred. As Sorokin predicted, the sensual mentality is most often replaced by an idealistic one, which represents the harmonious development of both the spiritual and the material world.

81% and 79% of respondents who gave preference to both spiritual and material values characterize the onset of an idealistic mentality. Thus, now, in the XXI-st century, we are witnessing the onset of an idealistic mentality that combines the harmonious development of both spiritual and material values. Taking into account the fact that active student youth was in the sample, that is, the future intellectual and creative elite, we can assert that the idealistic mentality, that we have identified, will only intensify over time.

We can also assume that the pandemic has accelerated the change of the material sensual mentality, since it was the period of the pandemic that forced many students to change their life priorities and values, putting physical and mental health higher in the hierarchy of values than the material sphere.

Such a distribution of answers among respondents may indicate a mental shift in relation to values among European youth, since surveys conducted among Russian youth

in different time periods systematically demonstrated to us the presence of an idealistic mentality and their priority of spiritual values, while in Europe the opposite is true [23; 29; 32].

Another question: **“If you had a period of prolonged self-isolation again, what would you do this time?”** was also aimed at identifying changes in mentality at the level of readiness for potential actions. That is, we, as researchers, defined not only a change in mentality, but also changes at the behavioral level. It was possible to choose one, the most preferred option, because we as researchers had to define behavioral priorities. The answers to this question also confirmed the change in mentality:

1) **“I would be engaged in self-development: I would meditate, read books, go in for sports, I would control my daily routine and diet”** - **63%** of respondents from Russian universities and **62%** of respondents from European universities.

As we have already mentioned, the question itself and the answer options were aimed at verifying the answers to the previous question and confirming the degree of adherence to idealistic values at the behavioral level. The idealistic mentality is a harmonious combination of the spiritual and the material, a balanced development of activity aimed at both self-development and the improvement of the surrounding world. The fact that almost the same majority of respondents in both samples preferred spiritual values suggests that the student youth of Europe and Russia not only proclaim spiritual values above material ones (idealistic mentality), but are also ready to prove it at the behavioral level.

2) **“I would create an online business, I would start earning more”** - **15%** of respondents from Russian universities and **19%** of students from the European sample.

3) **“I would communicate more in social networks”** - **3%** Russian respondents, and

accordingly the same number, 3% students from European universities.

4) **"I would eat more, sleep and watch TV"** - 8% of Russians, 5% of Europeans.

5) **"I would join the volunteer movement and help people"** - 5% of Russian students, 4% of European students,

6) **"I would create my own political party and change the world for the better"** - 2% of Russian students, 3% of youth in European countries.

In the options "Other choice" 4% of Russian-speaking and the same 4% of European respondents chose various types of creativity, for example: "would write a novel", "would record a new music album". And also "improve the world for the better", "spend more time with friends, family, develop interpersonal relationships" - these are all indicators confirming the idealistic mentality.

5.2. Political values of the youth of Russia and Europe

The integrated model of youth values that we have proposed, includes the system of its political values. In this regard, we asked our respondents a question that was aimed at identifying the ideal form of government and it sounded like this: **Which form of government seems to you the most fair one?** (one answer was possible to underline the priorities).

1) **Democratic** - 87% of Russian-speaking youth and 76% of Europeans

2) **Authoritarian** - 7% of students of Russian universities, 8% of Europeans

3) **Totalitarian** - 2.5% of the Russian-speaking sample, 5% of Europeans

4) **Other** - 3.5% of Russian-speaking youth and 11% of Europeans. If the Russian-speaking respondents suggested such options as polity, constitutional monarchy, socialist, etc., then the European students offered a significantly larger number of options for alternative government, the answers expressed disappointment in democracy, for

example: "life without government", "democracy is illusion", offering aristocracy, monarchy, socialism, parliamentary monarchy, etc.

Europe has been living in democracy for a century, and Russia for only 30 years, making it obvious that European Youth knows all the pros and cons of a democratic state structure and its various forms - "social democracy", "consultative democracy", etc. When the European Value Study asks people whether democracy is better than other forms of government, the majority answers in the affirmative.¹⁰ However, there are major differences. Support for democracy is strong in Western Europe, especially in Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Greece. And in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics of Estonia and Latvia, only one of five people think the democratic system is "very good." In Russia, its own model of democracy, different from the European one, is being formed. It is no better and no worse than the European one, but it is based on the domestic mentality and is only at the stage of formation.

For mental and historical reasons, it cannot coincide with the American and European democracies cultivated today, which in turn causes Russian youth to be critical of the democratic foundations of their country. This is confirmed by our study, while the percentage of Russian youth who share democratic values is high and does not differ much from the European.

Continuing to identify the political values of young people, we asked them to rank the given political values (Table 1), where 1 is the lowest score, 5 is the highest):

¹⁰ <https://i0.wp.com/europeanvaluesstudy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/democracy.jpg?ssl=1>

Ranking by respondents of the given political values, %

Value	Students	Rank of value				
		1	2	3	4	5
Freedom of speech and press	Russian	5	8	18	21	48
	European	7	4	12	18	59
Equality of all citizens before the law	Russian	6	4	12	10	68
	European	6	5	13	16	60
Availability of universal suffrage	Russian	6	8	20	17	49
	European	6	8	26	24	36
Political pluralism	Russian	6	9	23	23	39
	European	9	9	31	22	29
Freedom of assembly and rallies	Russian	15	13	23	16	33
	European	5	6	17	24	48

The basic democratic value for the youth of Russia and Europe was the **equality of all citizens before the law**, it was supported by the highest score of "5" - **68% of Russian** respondents and **60% of European** respondents.

The next value of democracy for young people is freedom of speech and press. For young people born and raised in the information society, this is especially important. **Freedom of speech and press** was supported by **48% of Russian** respondents and **59% of Europeans**.

It is important that freedom of speech can only be realized in a democratic regime. The right to express one's opinion freely includes freedom to hold one's opinion and freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media without any interference from public authorities and regardless of frontiers.

The next value of democracy in ranking our respondents is **the existence of universal suffrage**. However, there is an obvious difference among the youth of Russia and Europe. **49% of Russians** consider it an important value, while **Europeans only 36%**. The electoral system of Russia is constantly in a state of change and after each electoral cycle in Russia, there are a huge number of complaints and lawsuits about violations. All this makes the Russian youth make a request for fair and clean elections, which raises in

their eyes the significance of this democratic value.

The fourth most important is **the freedom of rallies and assembly**. Here, the significance of this value of democracy is higher among **European youth - 48%**, than among representatives of **Russian youth - 33%**. Obviously, this distribution of answers confirms the correctness of the answers to the question about readiness to participate in unsanctioned rallies. The youth of Europe are ready to participate in unsanctioned rallies (39%) and have an urgent request for freedom of assembly and rallies (48%), which allows us to conclude that the preferred type of political participation is mobile. It can be assumed that mobile political participation for young Europeans, both sanctioned and unsanctioned, is a rational choice based on the real possibility of political advancement for them.

The significance of the mobile political participation of student youth is very high, it is enough to recall only a few events. 1968 is the year of student riots that cracked open the then world landscape. One of their main results can be considered the transformation of the university into the center of politics. "Red May" in 1968 forever made Paris a symbol of youth unrest. Student unrest in Europe changed political regimes and gave rise to political leaders of a new formation. So, within ten days in November 1989, a student protest in Prague turned into a nationwide general strike, causing

the ruling Communist Party to abdicate. As a result of this movement, Czechoslovakia peacefully became two independent countries in 1993.

For Russian youth, freedom of rallies and meetings is important as a democratic value, but does not have such high support - 33%. This can be explained by the fact that in Russia, during periods of intense resistance to some political decisions (the “white ribbons” movement in December 2011, protests in support of A. Navalny in June 2017, etc.), changes are immediately made very quickly to the Law on Freedom of Assembly in order to toughen responsibility for its violation, while expanding the possibilities and options for legitimate participation, so the guarantee of freedom of assembly in society is updated frequently and thereby reduces the demand for it.

The last democratic value on the list is **political pluralism**, but the results are quite different. This value was supported by **39% of respondents in Russia** and **29% in Europe**. In European countries, this value is already well-established, while in Russia it is still in its infancy.

5.3. Political activity of the youth of Russia and Europe

To build an integral model of values, we needed data on the type and level of different political participation among the surveyed youth. To do this, we asked several questions verifying each other.

One of the questions was aimed at determining the degree of political activity and readiness to express it openly. It sounded like this: “Are you ready to participate in protest activities?” The distribution of responses is shown in Table 2.

The results obtained in this question confirm the results obtained in another question, where we asked about the willingness to go out into the streets in open

protests in case of a conflict of interest. Recall that the potential readiness for action was approximately in the same proportions (39% of Europeans and 11% of Russian students).

Table 2
Distribution of respondents' answers to the question “Are you ready to participate in protest events?”, %

Answer	Russian students	European students
Yes	14	47
No	45	29
Only if they are allowed	39	18
Other	2 % – “ready, if it does not endanger their safety” is the most common answer	6 % answer options are “yes, but not at the risk of getting sick”, “for the eco-movement, not politics”, “this will lead to nothing bad”.

But here we are talking about real participation. This once again confirms our thesis about the different meanings of protests in society, and most importantly, motivation. For Russian youth, participation in protest rallies is getting into the “black list” with all the ensuing consequences, perhaps even administrative responsibility and, as a result, trouble at the university. For European youth, this is a familiar form of expressing one's views and attitude to power, which can even give opportunity for further advancement in a political career.

5.4. The attitude of the youth of Russia and Europe to universal values and happiness.

To understand the integral model of value and the components of happiness, we also asked the youth of Russia and Europe an open question: “What, in your opinion, makes a person happy?”.

In the Russian-speaking sample, the most common answers are:

- Freedom,
- A family,
- Money,

- (Fig. 1).



The strength of the emerging idealistic mentality is manifested in its consistently strong expression in the answers to all the questions that determine it. The importance of self-knowledge and work on oneself (peace with oneself) is balanced by the values of financial stability and the values of the family. Actually, our respondents in Russia and Europe listed the values of the idealistic mentality in different languages, in different words, but, in fact, almost the same [30].

We also have to point out the absence of an infantile consumer attitude towards the state among the respondents. The position of "expecting happiness" is not traced in the answers to the open question. The youth of

Russia and Europe unanimously determine the parameters of happiness and the ways to achieve it (work on oneself, self-development).

For its meaningful completeness, the integral model of youth values requires to identify their attitude to the understanding of HAPPINESS and its components, for this, the students of Russia and Europe were asked the following question: "In order for your life to be happy, you need (choose no more than two options)".

The distribution of responses is given in Table3

Table 3

Distribution of answers to the question "In order for your life to be happy, you need to...", %

№	Answer (choose no more than two answers)	Russian students	European students
1	Have opportunities and time for self-development and creativity	47	56
2	Have a happy family and children	53	53
3	Live in a stable state, be socially protected	44	25
4	Be a cosmopolitan and choose by myself a country and society to live in	17	19
5	Have a stable job, career and financial success	66	54
6	Other	"have more free time for self-development, creativity", "have stable mental health", "remain human"	"know that you and your family are safe when you go to bed", "legal cannabis and no borders", "all of the above five options".

The answers to this question, which is designed to prioritize the components of happiness, only confirm the results already obtained on other questions that determine the integral model of youth values.

The sensual materialistic mentality gave

way to an idealistic mentality with a combination of first spiritual and then material values. This question was aimed at identifying and more clearly defining the spiritual values of today's youth. As we can see, among the spiritual values both in Russia and in Europe, the values of self-realization and self-development prevail: 47% of Russian and 56% of European students preferred them. Thus, the consistent expression of the change of mentalities, expressed in responses to differently formulated questions, speaks of deep changes that have really taken place in the minds of the youth both in Russia and Europe, both at the level of mentality and at the behavioral level.

The same definition of family and children as priority values (interesting coincidence - 53% in both Russian and European samples!) suggests that young people are no longer sensually egocentric.

The equally high recognition of the values of having a job and financial success in Russia (66%) and Europe (54%) confirms the idealism of the modern mentality. Namely, with the full recognition of spiritual values, material values are also recognized, accepted and set as desirable for achievement.

There is one point, where the values of the Russian and European youth do not coincide: **"to live in a stable state and be socially protected"** - it is important for 44% of Russians and only for 25% of Europeans. This can be explained by the fact that in most European countries such needs as a "stable state" and "social security" are already being satisfied. Therefore, they are relevant only for 25% of Europeans. For Russians (especially for students with low or no scholarships), social insecurity and the instability of state power makes these components of happy life especially relevant.

We want to point out that there are no correct answers to this question. Here we are

measuring values over a given historically and politically unique time span in countries with perceived value differences. We state that these value differences are not significant, and the idea of happiness among Europeans and Russians is practically the same. Based on the socio-cultural dynamics of the mentalities of P. Sorokin, it can be extrapolated that the idealistic mentality (as well as its components of a happy life) will continue to gain strength and, having reached its peak, will be replaced by an ideational, that is, more pronounced spiritual (with a predominance of spiritual values as necessary components for a happy life).

Due to the cyclicity and relativity of values and components of happiness, in our study we adhere to the point of view that there is no single correct answer in the components of a happy life. There are only indicators of a certain mentality in a certain period of time, which may coincide across countries or differ. These values, as components of happiness, are temporary in nature and will change over time due to the cyclical nature of the sociocultural processes themselves in society.

6. Conclusions.

Thus, based on the results of our research and determination of the integral model of values of modern youth, as well as changes in the socio-cultural mentality, we can say that, according to the cyclical change of socio-cultural mentalities, we are talking about a full and consistent onset of the idealistic mentality.

According to the integral model of values, we reach a more voluminous level of diagnostics and say that in addition to a harmonious combination of spiritual and material values, the components of a happy life, as well as its meaning, the youth of Russia and Europe sees in finding inner harmony and happiness, happiness with their loved ones

and family well-being.

Only after satisfying spiritual needs, young people consider success in the material world. The priority is given in the order in which they are listed. We can say that *the integral model of values*, formed both under the influence of the cyclicity of mentalities and under the influence of the external environment (the pandemic, of course, accelerated the process of changing mentalities, putting mental and physical health in first place in the system of value coordinates), is a single, logically connected system of values that do not contradict each other, complement each other and, thanks to their reliance on internal resources, make the actors of the social space of Russia and Europe resistant to the influences of the external environment by searching for support within themselves and in the nearest social circle.

7. Discussion

At the beginning of the study, we set the task of determining the mental attitudes of the youth of Russia and Europe, since they are basic and give a conceptual understanding of the value systems of modern young people. The answers to them made it possible to establish that the idealistic mentality prevails in an overwhelming form, both among Russian and European youth. Given the fact that student youth, that is, the future political, intellectual and creative elite, participated in the survey, we can assert that the idealistic mentality that we have identified, will only intensify over time.

The main reason for this mental shift is that the pandemic has accelerated the change of the material sensual mentality, because it was the period of the pandemic that forced many to change their life priorities and values, putting physical and mental health higher in the hierarchy of values than the material sphere and “conquest of the world”. It is also interesting here that the mentalities of European and Russian students are almost

identical in their values. That is, we can talk about the existence of a single mentality with a system of values that practically coincides both in terms of the combination of spirituality and materiality, and in relation to the purely material and only spiritual. As is often the case with a change in mentality, purely material (sensual mentality) from absolute dominance in the XX-th century (empirically confirmed by P. Sorokin), now, with its change, has gone into an absolute minority (4% of Russian and 5% of European students).

If the priority of the idealistic mentality of the youth of Russia was almost always confirmed by previous studies (this was noted in the text of the report earlier), then the turn of European youth towards it occurred quite recently, which confirms our conclusion about the factors that influenced this.

The youth of Russia and Europe have much more in common with regard to such an important component of our integral model of values as their attitude to basic social and human values. The same definition of family and children as priority values (53% in Russia and Europe) suggests that young people are no longer sensually egocentric. The creation and development of the family as a social institution, defining it as a priority value suggests that young people have ceased to be self-centered and are ready to give away the acquired social benefits and create strong social cells.

It should be noted that this largely runs counter to the stereotypical opinion that has developed in relation to the youth of Europe. It is believed that the family is not a value for young Europeans, and this is confirmed by such objective social indicators as "late" marriages, low birth rate, high percentage of so-called "civil marriages". The data confirms again the massive mental shift towards an idealistic mentality among Europeans.

In one position, the values of the youth

of Russia and Europe do not coincide: "to live in a stable state and be socially protected" is important for 44% of Russians and only for 25% of Europeans. Meanwhile, socialism is the most acceptable political doctrine to 42% of Europeans and only to 33% of Russians (for Russians liberalism is essential – 49% voted for this).

This can be explained by the fact that for most European countries such needs as a "stable state" and "social security" are already satisfied. Therefore, they are relevant only for 25% of Europeans. For Russians (especially for students with low or no scholarships), the theme of social insecurity and the historical memory of the instability of state power, make these components of a happy life especially relevant.

Thus, on the basis of the study, we not only managed to identify the already established values and, on the basis of them, draw up an integration model of the values of the youth of Russia and Europe through their comparison, but also to determine the needs of today's youth for certain values.

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