Subject. Russian civil procedure has adopted a differentiated approach to standards of proof in civil cases: not only is the “balance of probabilities” standard applied, but also prima facie, “clear and convincing evidence,” and “beyond a reasonable doubt”. This approach entails a number of difficulties, ranging from finding reasons to lower or raise the standard of particular categories of cases to identifying the permissible extent of differentiation within the context of legal certainty and predictability of judicial proceedings. The standards of proof inevitably influence well-established institutions of Russian procedural law (burden of proof, judicial review, etc.), at times requiring a reassessment of traditional approaches.

   The purpose of the study. To describe the legal issues arising from the differentiation of standards of proof in cases involving damage compensation and bankruptcy proceedings.

   Methodology. Methods of analysis and comparison based on practice of the Supreme Arbitration Court, of the Supreme Court, of scientific research in the field of civil procedural law.

  The main results of research and the field of their application. The application of the “clear and convincing evidence” standard by the Supreme Court in cases involving compensation for damages caused by a person authorised to act on behalf of a legal entity may be justified from a policy and legal standpoint, but it is inappropriate in terms of the actual accessibility of evidence for the parties involved in the proceedings. When the burden of proving the reasonableness and good faith of actions is shifted to the defendant, the standard of proof is reduced to the “balance of probabilities.” The application of heightened standards of proof in bankruptcy cases naturally increases the interest of creditors and bankruptcy trustees in seeking to revise court rulings issued prior to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. This, in turn, highlights the importance of defining the permissible scope of creditors’ rights to challenge such rulings.

   Conclusion. The adjustment of the standard of proof – whether upward or downward – must not be used as a situational tool. The adoption of a standard other than the “balance of probabilities” in civil litigation must be grounded in substantial justification and aligned with established procedural rules.