The article analyses the common egalitarian foundations of contemporary liberal theories of social justice in the context of normative political-legal thought. The study aims to confirm the hypothesis that the dominant paradigms of contemporary Anglo-American liberal philosophy – utilitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism – share a commitment to the ideal of fundamental moral equality, despite profound differences in their normative conclusions.The methodology employed is a combination of conceptual analysis and comparative theory to identify the underlying assumptions of theories of justice and their implications for legal institutions.The study demonstrates that although these theoretical traditions advocate divergent positions on property rights, taxation, and redistribution, they are united by an appeal to equal concern and respect for all individuals. Utilitarianism justifies redistributive policies on the basis of maximising aggregate welfare, treating everyone’s happiness as equally significant. Liberal egalitarianism, rooted in Kantian moral theory, emphasises equal dignity and argues for institutional structures that promote fair equality of opportunity, even at the cost of substantial redistribution. Libertarianism, while opposing redistribution of income and wealth carried out by the state, invokes equality in its defence of individual autonomy, property rights, and self-ownership, rejecting coercive interference as inconsistent with equal moral status. By reconstructing the internal logic of each theory, the article argues that the disagreement among these frameworks centres not on whether equality matters, but on the appropriate “currency of equality” – whether justice requires equality of resources, opportunities, welfare, or respect for autonomy, civil rights, and self-ownership. The analysis highlights the implications of sthese disagreements for constitutional theory, legal policy, and the interpretation of socio-economic rights.The conclusion affirms the study’s hypothesis and emphasizes the necessity of an explicit democratic dialogue about the proper metric of equality in law and policymaking. Rather than relying on implicit or historically contingent legal interpretations, the paper calls for legal scholars and policymakers to engage in principled reasoning about what kind of equality legal institutions ought to embody. Such reflection is essential for designing legal institutions that are not only formally fair but substantively just.